Arctic region shines spotlight on Russia, China ‘friendship’

In 2022, on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Presidents Putin and Xi declared a “friendship without limits” between China and Russia. This new stance poured accelerant on a previously simmering debate among Western analysts at the time about whether these two U.S. competitors were on a path to a lasting marriage forged through the mutual benefit of resource development and shipping, or frenemies in a marriage of convenience, with a divorce not a question of if but when the relationship lost its attraction. Now, with the benefit of almost three years of hindsight, it looks like there may be an emerging answer to the extent or limits to the Sino-Russian relationship, and it lies – at least in part – north of the Arctic Circle.

Both Russia and China have interests in the Arctic, but they have very different vantage points and histories. Russia has an immense amount of legally recognized territory in the Arctic, seeks to leverage differences in interpretation of governance mechanisms to control a potentially emerging shipping route, and focuses a good portion of its long-term economic wellbeing and security in the north.  China formally recognizes Arctic state sovereignty and opportunistically asserts its interests in the region as an emerging global power, seeking toe holds in the region through commercial ventures and trade agreements, infrastructure investments, scientific cooperation, and as an increasingly intermittent presence on the High Seas, and in the future, perhaps below the waves as well.

Even as media reports and government documents such as the U.S. Department of Defense Arctic Strategy have emphasized growing ties between China and Russia through the north, China has not been writing a blank check to further grow Siberian natural gas. Despite Putin’s entreaties to Xi, the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline continues to lack a firm commitment from Beijing. U.S. sanctions appear to be having some impact on Russia’s ability to involve Chinese companies in developing new liquid natural gas (LNG) projects.

Russia is also not China’s only opportunity to engage in the Arctic. China has maintained its free trade agreement with Iceland, signed in 2013, and has formally engaged Norway about a free trade agreement. Though China’s realized economic stakes (as an investor and as a market) outside Siberian natural gas remain relatively small, China remains, for example, Alaska’s largest export market, and a Chinese company holds a minority stake in a Canadian mining firm that operates Alaska’s Red Dog (zinc) Mine.

Russia, too, appears to be holding China, if not at arm’s length, then at least at a palm’s length, in the Arctic. Russia definitely intends for its northern resources and Northern Sea Route (NSR) waterway to be open for business. Yet evidence suggests that it still very much seeks control of commercial activities through management of the NSR, which Chinese companies primarily use in addition to Russia itself for resource exports and domestic port-to-port logistics.

In another example, Russia and China have conducted well publicized joint maritime exercises and patrols in the North Pacific in the vicinity of the Aleutian Islands as well as most recently in late September 2024  in the Bering Sea. These voyages are indeed quite far north for China and solidly within the United States’ definition of the Arctic, but are still south of the majority of the Russian Arctic coast, and were reported by U.S. sources as in accordance with international law.

China is also not Russia’s only market for its resources. India has found Russia to be a relatively cheap source of energy, though Delhi appears committed to not buying from projects under Western sanctions, such as Arctic LNG 2 in northern Siberia. India has expressed interest in the past in engaging Russia on shipping logistics through the Arctic and along the route from Chennai to Vladivostok, and Russia may look to India for help in building new icebreaking vessels to support NSR activities.

Some analysts believe that China ultimately views stability in the Arctic as beneficial for long-term economic prospects, whereas Russia may promote “destabilizing activities” when it believes that is in its interests. Indeed, China does not benefit from keeping all its northern eggs in Russia’s basket, and it will need to craft careful messaging about its Naval and Coast Guard excursions in the North Pacific – in July 2024, the U.S. Coast Guard reported that the Chinese Navy signaled that their presence near the Aleutian Islands was  “freedom of navigation operations,” quite likely a reference to U.S. and other like-minded nation policies on the South China Sea.

Western countries should remain clear-eyed that there are limits to the Sino-Russian relationship and must view current events in a historical context – China and Russia have a long, sordid history together; their relationship can hardly be compared, for example, to that between the United States and Canada. This leaves plenty of room for Western Arctic countries to be more nuanced in their approaches to engaging (or not) with Russia and China. Using the same engagement approach with both and not recognizing how different they are as Arctic actors only puts the West at a disadvantage when such differences could be leveraged diplomatically to help promote peace and security in the far north.

Dr. Abbie Tingstad is a visiting professor of Arctic research at the Center for Arctic Study and Policy at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.  The views here are her own and not those of the Coast Guard Academy or other branches of the U.S. government.