Canada’s new Arctic foreign policy is a missed opportunity: Commentary

Mélanie Joly, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, unveiled the country’s latest Arctic foreign policy (AFP) this month. While the government has come up with some good ideas, it should have been bolder – particularly on defence.

Joly delivered the new policy after consulting with Canadian departments, territorial governments and Indigenous stakeholders. It offers crucial insights into how Ottawa will integrate its domestic and international priorities for Arctic affairs,

The main strengths of the AFP relate to the recognition of the Arctic losing its exceptionalism. Acknowledging that the securitization of the region is now a top priority to avoid traditional state-to-state conflicts over territorial and maritime sovereignty and the necessity to protect the Arctic’s climate, marine ecosystems, and Indigenous Peoples, Canada is seemingly endeavouring to tackle regional security with a pragmatic approach.

The emphasis on Moscow and Beijing carving out avenues to assert their interests through conventional and grey-zone tactics correctly highlights an emerging Sino-Russian maritime security bloc that prioritizes collaboration on joint Arctic interests in an attempt to capitalize on the region’s strategic riches and geographical advantages.

Canada’s appeal to fortify the region’s rules-based architecture, best captured by Ottawa appointing an Arctic ambassador and opening consulates in Greenland and Alaska, demonstrates the advantages liberal rules, norms and principles have afforded Arctic nations across the spectrum of hard, soft and human security and the need to protect them.

The inclusion of Indigenous Peoples as active and equal partners in Arctic affairs, as it relates to international relations, removes the possibility of the latter being manipulated by belligerent powers through disinformation and misinformation for the sake of cultivating political barriers on Canadian unity regarding the Arctic.

Despite these strengths, Canada’s AFP should have gone further. At its core, a foreign policy guides a country’s diplomatic interactions and relationships with other countries by identifying outcomes that incite collaboration and cooperation for mutually shared interests and redlines that demonstrate resolve to not depart from key national interests along hard, soft and human security.

Frustratedly, regarding hard security, Canada’s AFP did not divert from any previous statements expressed in its newest defence policy or recent announcements for procuring new platforms and assets for Arctic defence.

Missing the opportunity, Canada should have identified the outcome of achieving peace through strength in the Arctic by attaining regional maritime dominance – in the sea, air, space, and cyber domains – with allies. In particular, the policy should have recognized the need for more joint defence opportunities among Arctic allies, within or independent of NATO, by putting forward a call to organize a Joint Arctic Expeditionary Force.

Observing the need for the Canadian Armed Forces to enhance capabilities with Arctic allies to respond rapidly to any military intrusions, above and below the threshold of an armed conflict, this initiative could have seen Canada lead and station allied military forces in its High North while increasing joint military planning and training environments to anticipate and address future military build-ups by Russia and China in the Arctic for malevolent or intimidation purposes.

On soft security issues, the AFP lacked any commitments to enforce and enhance maritime safety. In particular, nowhere in the policy did Canada mention its stance against using dark fleets in the Arctic to avoid international sanctions or their use for auxiliary tasks supporting naval operations. Also absent was any attention on the economic and environmental damages caused by Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing or the use of coast guard organizations to harass, intimidate and provoke civilians living in the Arctic.

With Russia and China exploiting these soft security issues in their regions, Canada’s AFP should have pushed for a coast guard pact among remaining Arctic Council members that would see joint investments for incorporating innovative technologies and platforms, like hybrid air vehicles, unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles, paired with autonomous systems and advanced AI capabilities, to monitor, detect and transfer data on Russian and Chinese transgressions against maritime laws in the Arctic.

Canada should have also taken the bold step and expressed a redline that it will observe and treat any Russian or Chinese dark fleets, coast guards or commercial and research vessels under suspicion or proven to have caused harmful transgressions in its sovereign waterways as a national security threat, prompting Ottawa to explore legal and military options to protect its interests and peoples in the Arctic.

The AFP could have been Canada’s opportunity to shake off its passive reputation on international security, installing a Joly Doctrine that would serve as the building block towards a more realistic-orientated tool of statecraft. Instead, the missed opportunities to declare clear-cut outcomes and redlines for the Arctic, and Canada’s role in helping lead regional responses, reinforces Ottawa’s reservation to indeed be an Arctic power.

Andrew Erskine is a research fellow at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy and a 2025 Arctic Frontier Emerging Leader