Commander of the Finnish Defense Forces: Take Russia seriously
According to General Janne Jaakkola, the West is losing its advantage and must take action now to counter a militarized Russia.
This is a reproduction of an article that first appeared on Sixty Degrees North. If you would like to read more posts by Peter Rybski, you can sign up for his blog here.
Geography heavily influences interests. I named this publication Sixty Degrees North because our current home is located just north of 60° latitude. Up here the sea freezes every winter, making icebreakers an important part of life.
But there is another important element to our location. 106 miles to the east lies the 830 mile long (1340 km) border between Finland and Russia. Because of history, Russia is always on the minds of the Finnish Defense Forces (FDF), even if they seldom speak publicly about the “dear neighbor.”
When they do speak publicly, we should listen.
Last Wednesday (November 27th) the Commander of the Finnish Defense Forces, General Janne Jaakkola1, spoke publicly about the growing threat from Russia.
A Grim Speech
In the speech, described by the Finnish newspaper Ilta Sanomat as “grim,” Gen. Jaakkola asserted that the threat of a large-scale Russian attack must be taken seriously. Further, the West is losing its qualitative advantage as Russia learns from its continued invasion of Ukraine.
The full speech is available here (in Finnish). I’ve pulled out a few key points from the speech below, under my own headings:
The War in Ukraine contains new elements, but it still relies on infantry and armor:
Contrary to the assumptions and interpretations of the early 2000s, Russia has shown over the past thousand days that it has returned to traditional mass infantry and artillery use. The role of drones and suicide drones has become a significant part of battlefield reality. However, advancing into battle is done by traditional means with armor, from which you go into battle in the same way as infantry.
Russia does not have the same values and fights accordingly:
Military action is also directed against society and the population as a whole. For almost three years now, we have seen Russia systematically strike deep into Ukraine with missiles, rockets and drones, targeting the population and, in particular, infrastructure critical to the functioning of society.
Russia does not seem to care about significant personnel or material losses. Political, economic or technological isolation is not a threshold. In its rhetoric, Russia blurs the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, such as a change in doctrine.
Despite earlier hopes, Russia is sustaining and growing its military capability aided by sanctions evasion and its foreign partners:
In the short term, Russia’s military capability will be preserved. The troops and leaders have war experience and insight into the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Western weapon systems. The nuclear weapon remains a strategic deterrent, and under its shadow Russia is able to generate and concentrate conventional power – albeit old equipment and poorly trained personnel for the Ukrainian front. According to estimates, the war economy is not sustainable, but despite the overheating of the economy, Russia seems to continue in the direction it has chosen. Energy revenues are intended to cover the financing needs of the war. The effectiveness of sanctions is undermined by Russia’s partnerships and sanctions evasion. The support Russia receives from its partners is significant in maintaining its ability to wage war.
The West is losing its qualitative advantage as Russia rapidly adapts to counter new technology and changing tactics:
The defense of one’s own territory against a symmetrical threat, as well as the ability for long-term high-intensity consumption warfare, has returned to the standard. This is not new to Finland, but the quantitative increase in the threat is already significant. When it comes to developing national or alliance defence, we cannot make selective investments, but all aspects of defence must be developed. This is where the West has a performance debt. It is necessary to increase the number and basic warfare capability, such as ammunition, while at the same time trying to maintain a qualitative advantage. Not all material will be new, but there is still a need for the material currently in use and in storage.
The West must try to maintain its performance advantage. This is challenged by the weapon-to-counter-weapon competition, in which the parties try to adapt to new systems and technologies appearing on the battlefield. In Ukraine, we see that in certain technologies the adaptation cycle of the adversary is 30-60 days, with drones often only the day range.
The West must be able to adapt faster than the Russians. But we no longer have the time for traditional development and procurement:
The aim is to make decision-making and the chain of influence faster than the adversary. This requires software, algorithms and artificial intelligence. The parts must be integrated into the whole, the interfaces must be leveled. For a soldier, the basic elements of the battlefield: see, move, shoot, communicate, protect – are changing. You have to be faster in everything, try to deceive and protect your own actions.
Roughly speaking, the armed forces had time, but not enough resources, in the last decade. Resources are now available, but not necessarily the time available for the traditional model, especially for years of development and procurement processes.
Technology may be important, but quality always matters.
With a technological lead, it is possible to surprise, take initiative and partly compensate for the numerical shorthandedness. However, we must always bear in mind that quantity always matters.
Closing Thoughts
It’s worth listening when Finnish Generals speak publicly about Russia.
Much of the daily coverage of the war in Ukraine concerns the current situation on the battlefield and the types of weapons/equipment employed against various targets. Gen. Jaakkola’s speech provides a necessary look on the long-term strategic implications of the more capable and aggressive Russia that will emerge regardless of the war’s final outcome. Notably, Russia is already closer to China and is undoubtedly sharing intelligence gathered about American/NATO weapons systems and tactics.
Gen. Jaakkola’s speech reminds me of the statement given by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (Europe), Gen. Chris Cavoli, to Congress back in April. After looking at Russia’s shift to a wartime economy and highlighting that many predictions (such as the collapse of Russia’s economy) failed to come to pass, he concluded that:
Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal, and angrier with the West than when it invaded.
Regardless of your thoughts on the current U.S./NATO/Western policies towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is worth considering the possible long-term effects of the war as highlighted in Gen. Jaakkola’s speech. While you’re at it, read Gen. Cavoli’s entire statement, too. It’s sobering.
Thanks for reading. If you like what you’ve read, hit the heart and share with a friend. Let me know if you’d like me to write more about Finland’s security situation. After writing this article, I’m considering an overview of how the Finnish Defense Forces work, as they function quite differently from the U.S. Military and other NATO forces.
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All the Best,
PGR
Peter Rybski is a retired U.S. Naval Officer who has been living in Finland since 2017. On his blog, he writes about subjects including military policies and capabilities, history and Nordic living.
