Opinion: Will the new U.S. defense strategy for the Arctic break the investment ice ceiling?
In the few weeks since the new U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic strategy was released on July 22, two Arctic communications satellites have launched through a U.S. partnership with Norway and the U.S. Army announced the stand up of an Arctic Aviation Command in Alaska. Such investments, several years in the making, suggest a positive trajectory for growing U.S. military capacity and capability in the far north, but can the momentum needed to implement the new strategy be sustained over the coming years?
The updated DoD Arctic strategy carries forward many previous themes with some important updates: In particular, a heavier focus on China – and the relationship it has with Russia – takes center stage in this new document, which also emphasizes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization more so than its 2019 predecessor. This signals an important shift in how the U.S. is orienting its focus on defense in the Arctic.
The document also rightly points out that the already warming relationship between Russia and China in the Arctic has accelerated since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the resulting additional Western economic sanctions levied on Russia, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s expansion via Finnish and Swedish membership. For the first time, Russia and China have operated naval vessels together in the vicinity of the Aleutian islands, appear to be testing the limits of the Polar Code agreement which regulates shipping in the polar regions, may have been complicit in damaging cables and a pipeline in the Baltic sea, and signed a maritime law enforcement agreement in Murmansk, the Arctic’s largest city and near the heart of Russia’s northern military hub.
Several investments are needed to enable more persistent and effective U.S. presence in the Arctic as geopolitical tensions and economic possibilities evolve. In the press briefing for the DoD Arctic strategy release Iris Ferguson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic and Global Resilience, described the strategy as “very action oriented,” and it does make the important business case for investing in people, partnerships, exercises, and technologies such as those that will help the U.S. armed services sense, communicate, and move in the region.
Whether the strategy will motivate a substantial investment will depend on the success of a subsequent implementation plan and budgeting support. Investing in the Arctic has been difficult for years in the U.S. Over a decade ago, then U.S. Northern Command General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. and then U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr. noted many of the same Arctic issues and gaps highlighted in this new Department of Defense strategy. Since then, incremental and uneven progress has been made, including through an agreement regarding icebreaking technology between the U.S., Canada, and Finland signed earlier in July 2024.
The strong emphasis on China’s activities in the region in the updated Department of Defense Arctic strategy could help overcome questions of immediacy and priority to justify expanding investment from a U.S. perspective. Last month, Chinese naval vessels conducted “freedom of navigation operations” near the Aleutian Islands, necessitating a U.S. Coast Guard response. More typically Chinese Arctic activities have been constrained to economic interests and scientific cooperation.
The updated DoD strategy also places emphasis on Finland and Sweden recently joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the role of partner engagements including dialogues and exercises. Working with partners will be crucial for enabling the U.S. to do more in the Arctic with its existing capabilities. It could also potentially further U.S. access to technology, logistics, and tactics that will further stretch each additional dollar spent.
There is one area in which the updated strategy is off the mark. In her press remarks for the strategy release, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks stated: “Russia’s ongoing illegal war in Ukraine has rendered government to government cooperation on Arctic matters, virtually impossible.” To the contrary, eliminating all dialogue and cooperation with Russia on Arctic matters has been impossible given the country’s immense presence in the region. The U.S. Coast Guard, for example, must continue communicating with the Border Service of Russia. More broadly, the Arctic Council – the region’s primary diplomatic forum that does not discuss military issues – has resumed some working level cooperation, including with Russia, under Norway’s chairship. These are narrow, but stabilizing channels that should be sustained to prevent misunderstanding and maintain potential pathways for future cooperation when appropriate and in U.S. national, and the collective, Arctic interest.
The updated U.S. DoD Arctic strategy reflects an evolution in thinking about security in the far north where the U.S., unlike in the Cold War, now simultaneously faces pressures on its doorstep from a “hot” belligerent neighbor – Russia – and a powerful competitor – China. Whatever Arctic bubble there once was, has burst, and U.S. national and regional interests in a secure, prosperous, sustainable, and peaceful Arctic demand commitment to sustained investments in the necessary infrastructure, capabilities, and capacities suited to meet the unique needs of the Arctic.
Dr. Abbie Tingstad is a visiting professor of Arctic research at the Center for Arctic Study and Policy at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Coast Guard Academy, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, Arctic Today or that of any organization with which the author is affiliated.
