The revival of ‘America First’? Where does the Arctic stand in Trump’s second term?
Kamrul Hossain, Research Professor at the Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Center, University of Lapland.
How far will Trump’s “America First” slogan survive in his second term as president, particularly in a world divided by the East-West and/or North-South setups?
The “America First” slogan heavily drove the presidential campaign in his first term. What does this mean in real life? Even if there is no explicit reference to how the policy might offer concrete nationwide outcome, in simple terms, it is about upholding America’s national interest, which is counter-balanced against its external policy, prioritizing the former. In other words, it is about reorganizing its foreign policy agenda, which must first serve America’s national policy goals and interests. This also means, among others, budget cuts for external and internal actions that are not a substantial priority for strict US interests, such as free-flowing of money to war in Ukraine, domestic issues related to refugee and immigration policy, etc.
During his first term, the “America First” policy was reflected, for example, in its trend to dis-engage in the rule-based international order, where there is a conflict with national policy interests, such as having been withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement or pulled out of the World Health Organization (WHO) – a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for global public health.
While the Biden administration re-instated these matters, Trump’s victory in the recent presidential election for the second term prompted many to believe he was reviving the “America First” policy and getting it back on track. In other words, as he expressed his intention during the presidential campaign, he will withdraw again from the Paris Climate Agreement, ignore any past emission reduction commitments, and not make any new plans for emission reduction. By potentially withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, he could block the climate financing efforts – the fact that the US is the second largest emitter in the world. This would mean no compromise in domestic economic growth – more drilling and investment in fossil fuel industries, undermining global climate concerns, bringing detrimental consequences into global climate governance. Trump’s determination to impose 10% tariffs on imports, even on nations with whom the US has strong alliances, might show how his action will likely affect the relationship with allies, let alone the relations with not-so-friendly nations, such as China and Russia.
Since the Ukraine war started at the beginning of 2022, the more distant relations the West has with Russia, the closer China has become in its relations with Russia, among others, on Arctic-related matters. If the “America First” slogan meant distancing from its allies and the rest of the world, it would indeed affect world politics, providing opportunities for countries like Russia and China to gain a more assertive position in global power politics. In such a scenario, the US allies on the other side of the Atlantic, particularly the NATO countries, might suffer from a lack of confidence in the overall global security ecosystem.
Hence, the question – Is Trump ready to weaken America’s presence and influence in its great power role? Most likely not! As president, Trump will use his authority and prerogative to re-direct America’s external and internal policies in favor of his “America First” slogan.
Yet, it is unlikely to make any significant efforts that could undermine the continuity of America’s foreign policy goals. For example, in his first term, concerning the Middle East, Trump was no different than Obama. Then Biden followed Trump’s policy in his second term, and in all likelihood, Trump would not go beyond the direction Biden had taken. The US has approximately 750 military bases in at least 80 countries. These overseas bases support the US’ capability beyond its territorial bounds towards various strategic aims to protect US interests and those of its allies. Their presence symbolizes America’s might and power as well as strategic demonstration to respond to any threats on its superpower status. All or most of these bases will continue operating as they have been and serve as the manifestation of America’s hard-power role in world politics, regardless of who becomes the US president.
The most challenging immediate foreign policy account for Trump might be to play a substantial role in bringing peace to Europe and the Middle East. While Trump is not at all likely to be out of the game in these scenarios, he might walk the talk to some extent, approaching an alternative direction, particularly concerning the Ukraine war. A concession proposal has already been on the air, suggesting a peace process for Ukraine contingent on the denouncement of Ukrainian territories occupied and controlled by Russia since the war started in February 2022. This will not be an amicable, acceptable, or easy solution – neither for Ukraine nor Europe. However, he will at least push for some sort of compromise deal and try to limit significant financial deals to support the war in Ukraine. Here, he would probably re-evaluate and re-equate the strategy with that of the European NATO allies, as he already expressed his dissatisfaction with the US’s overspending in the alliance. He is seemingly reluctant to continue investing in NATO without seeing a commitment to significant contributions from European NATO allies. In fact, there is a strong sense of push in his expression for the NATO leadership shift from America to Europe.
While such an approach would tend to weaken Western dominance in global power politics and have cascading effects on Europe’s security, Trump and his comrades see it as making Europe “self-reliant” and strong in its security terms, which indeed calls for critical assessments.
While Europe’s security will still be a priority in terms of NATO’s appearance on the scene, in the Middle East, Trump would still, here again, follow the previous administration’s line but would probably play a more passive role in the peace process, especially leading to the two-state solution approach. Instead, he will allow and support Israel to continue to do what needs to be done to “finish the job.” In the Middle East, ties with Israel will continue to be stronger, whereas its adversary with Iran will further increase with more sanctions. The continued and strengthened tie with Israel will probably also be seen to its advantage to deter Iran from rising as a regional power and fighting back with its proxies in Lebanon and Yemen. Here, support from the European allies, both logistical and moral, will strengthen Trump’s engagement in military cooperation and coordination. This means yet a strengthened cooperation through with the enhanced NATO capability. So, the conclusion is as follows: Trump will continue where Biden left off despite his twist on these in global power politics.
Amidst the challenges in the global security scenario, where will Arctic security be placed on Trump’s agenda? Apparently, Trump will not see the Arctic separately, which means that the Arctic does not exist in isolation from global political dynamics. At least he would not see the Arctic without placing a reference to the European security framework. In fact, the Arctic traditionally was not one of the high priorities in US domestic policy until the beginning of the century.
From 2006 onward, the Arctic has been discussed and presented considerably in the US national policy framework, primarily from the homeland security perspective. In the 2024 US Arctic Strategy was released by the Department of Defense (DoD), where security was the top priority out of four pillars, aiming to protect US sovereignty and that of its allies by enhancing capabilities. With the war in Ukraine and the subsequent membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO, Arctic security infrastructure has exponentially aligned with the Arctic NATO members’ national security. In other words, the Arctic will be considered part of Trump’s North Atlantic security project, which can be explained by the rivalry between NATO-Arctic and Russia on the one hand and the latter’s engagement with non-Arctic countries in the Arctic matters, such as China, on the other hand. In this context, the BRICS alliance would likely create a broader distance in the Arctic between Russia and the rest of the Arctic countries. Although, unlike the NATO alliance, BRICS does not cover military aspects, it suffices to clarify the split between the two blocks, leading to two directions for influencing Arctic security politics globally.
The Arctic NATO members will likely invest in more military exercises to enhance capability in the Arctic conditions, responding to Russia’s increasing military presence in the region. The overall scenario has already transformed the Arctic cooperation framework from a “zone of peace” to a “zone of tension” if not entirely a “zone of conflict.” It is evident, however, that Trump’s commitment to combat climate change and protect the Arctic’s environmental security will be heavily affected in the second term. Trump is not likely to care much about environmental issues despite the current US strategy placing the Arctic’s environmental protection as the second priority. Whereas sustainable economic development and international cooperation were placed third and fourth, respectively; as stated above, Trump’s intention to pull out from the global climate change regulatory regime, in combination with the granting of more drilling licenses in Alaska, are expected to heavily damage both sustainable development in the Arctic and international Arctic cooperation.
In this context, one might remember that during Trump’s first term, the Arctic Council’s 2019 Ministerial meeting, for the first time in its history, concluded without adopting a Declaration due to the disagreement on the use of climate change language between the US on one side and the rest of its members, including Russia, on the other. The reflection will be there in his second term, too, which will not be probably any different, especially on the Arctic’s climate change agenda. He seemingly will carry as little pressure as possible regarding the sustenance of Arctic institutions, such as the Arctic Council, given its focus on environmental protection and sustainable development driven by the climate change agenda. Such reluctance, along with the current pause in the Arctic Council’s operation and Russia’s threatening to withdraw from the Arctic Council, will complicate the quicker resumption of Arctic-wide cooperation. Moreover, the US, which has not yet ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and possible withdrawal from the Paris Agreement may cause consequences of counter-measures from Russia (that already hinted at some point to consider withdrawing from the UNCLOS), which might heavily weaken the rule-based order in the Arctic governance structure, and probably will cause even further delay in the resumption of the Arctic Council’s functioning. In contrast, Trump will likely work toward more self-reliant and mutually beneficial security cooperation and strategy with his European Arctic allies, centered on NATO as part of the trans-Atlantic framework rather than focusing on the Arctic separately.
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